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Money and Capital as Competing Media of Exchange 




We construct a model in which capital competes with fiat money as a medium of 
exchange, and establish conditions on fundamentals under which fiat money can be both 
valued and socially beneficial. When the socially efficient stock of capital is too low to 
provide the liquidity agents need, they overaccumulate productive assets to use as media 
of exchange. When this is the case, there exists a monetary equilibrium that dominates 
the nonmonetary one in terms of welfare. Under the Friedman rule, fiat money provides 
just enough liquidity so that agents choose to accumulate the same capital stock a social 
planner would. 
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We study an economy where real assets (capital goods) compete with ﬁat money as a medium
of exchange, and address the following questions: Can ﬁat money be valued — and useful to
society — when real assets can be used as means of payment? Does the production of real assets
provide enough liquidity to the economy? How do economies respond to liquidity shortages in
the absence of ﬁat money?
We adopt the search-theoretic approach of Kiyotaki and Wright [7, 8] since it is well-suited
to study which objects endogenously emerge as media of exchange. In order to allow for
competition between nominal and real assets, we follow Lagos and Wright [9] and give agents
periodic access to competitive markets where they can trade all assets. In addition, we let
agents choose which assets to use as a means of payment in decentralized trades and impose no
restrictions on their portfolios.
We establish a condition on fundamentals under which ﬁat money can be valued and socially
beneﬁcial. This condition states that money has a welfare-enhancing role when the capital
stock that a social planner would accumulate is smaller than the stock of assets that agents
need to conduct transactions. In the nonmonetary equilibrium, this liquidity shortage confers
the assets that can be used as a medium of exchange an additional return, and this induces
agents to overaccumulate capital. Capital plays two roles in this economy: it has a productive
role and it provides liquidity services. Its rate of return can be decomposed into a liquidity
return, related to its role in the exchange process, and an intrinsic return associated with its
productive role.
The introduction of ﬁat money helps to disentangle the productive use of the real asset
from its liquidity use and induces agents to reduce the ineﬃciently high stock of capital goods.
In the monetary equilibrium, money has the same rate of return as liquid capital since agents
can exploit arbitrage opportunities in the centralized market. The Friedman Rule (deﬂating
at the rate of time preference) is the optimal monetary policy and it induces the eﬃcient
accumulation of capital in the monetary equilibrium. Finally, there are also parametrizations
under which the socially eﬃcient capital stock provides enough liquidity to the economy, and
in these circumstances ﬁat money is neither useful nor valued.
The notion of capital goods being used as media of exchange is not a pure theoretical
abstraction. Einzig [5, pp. 116—117] provides several accounts of primitive societies using
2capital goods — mainly cattle — as currency, and presents anecdotal evidence on the ineﬃciencies
associated with such arrangements:
‘Goats and cattle were until comparatively recently the principal currency of a large
part of Kenya. (...) In some districts livestock still constitutes the principal medium of
exchange, in addition to serving social functions arising from the surviving tribal system.
(...) Owing to the fact that cattle is, or was until recently, the sole currency of the Masai,
they are grossly overstocked, far beyond requirements. (...) Before British control over the
territories inhabited by them in Kenya and Tanzania became eﬀective, the diﬃculties of
over-stocking were overcome through raids on agricultural communities whose population
was destroyed or enslaved, and whose cultivated land was turned into pasturage. When this
could no longer be done, over-stocking tended to cause soil erosion. Once the cattle has
eaten every blade of grass oﬀ the land, the soil turns into dust under the scorching, tropical
sun, and the wind blows it away, leaving nothing but bare rocks. This problem of ﬁrst-rate
gravity preoccupied the Colonial Administrations in Kenya and other countries of East and
South Africa. Deﬁciency of water supplies is also aggravated by overstocking. The remedy
lies in inducing the Africans to abandon the monetary use of cattle and other livestock. (...)
In the report of the Kenya Agricultural Commission Sir Daniel Hall suggested the issue of
coins bearing the image of cows or goats, or to provide special tokens shaped like livestock
and convertible into modern money, to bridge the psychological gap between the use of
animal and mineral tokens of exchange.’
Our model rationalizes Einzig’s diagnosis — the use of a productive asset as a medium of
exchange can result in an ineﬃciently large stock of the asset — and at the same time lends
theoretical support to the Agricultural Commission’s policy recommendation of introducing ﬁat
money to mitigate this ineﬃciency.
There are also several interesting connections between our analysis and previous studies in
monetary theory. The idea that commodity standards are undesirable because they distort the
allocation of the commodity used in exchange can be traced back to Friedman [6]. The result
that nonmonetary equilibria can exhibit overaccumulation of capital goods has been shown to
be a feature of the overlapping generations [2] and Bewley models of monetary exchange [3]. But
while these models emphasize the store of value and insurance functions of money, our search-
based model captures the role of money as a medium of exchange. Our work is also related to
3previous models of commodity money, such as Sargent and Wallace [11], Kiyotaki and Wright
[7], Banerjee and Maskin [2] and Burdett et al. [4], which also ﬁnd that commodity monies are
socially ineﬃcient arrangements. However, previous treatments of commodity money based on
search theory diﬀer from ours in that — as Banerjee and Maskin [2, pp. 959—960] point out —
they lack centralized markets and impose severe restrictions on agents’ portfolios that limit the
extent to which ﬁat money and real assets compete as media of exchange.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the optimal allocations. Section 4 formulates the individual decision problem and
introduces the notion of equilibrium. Section 5 studies the coexistence of money and productive
assets: it derives the conditions under which ﬁat money circulates and analyzes the implications
for asset returns and welfare. Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains all proofs.
2 The model
The basic environment is that of Lagos and Wright [9]. Time is discrete, continues forever
and each period is divided into two subperiods where diﬀerent activities take place. There is
a [0,1] continuum of agents, and two types of perfectly divisible commodities — general and
special goods. Each agent produces a subset and consumes a diﬀerent subset of the special
goods. Specialization is modeled as follows. Given two agents i and j drawn at random,
t h e r ea r et h r e ep o s s i b l ee v e n t s .T h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a ti consumes something j produces but not
vice-versa (a single coincidence) is denoted α. Symmetrically, the probability that j consumes
something i produces but not vice-versa is also α. In a single-coincidence meeting we call buyer
the agent who wishes to consume and seller the agent who produces. The probability neither
wants anything the other can produce is 1 − 2α,w h i c hm e a n sα ≤ 1/2. The specialization of
agents over consumption and production of the special good gives rise to a double-coincidence-
of-wants problem. In contrast to special goods, general goods can be consumed and produced
by all agents.
Special goods can only be produced during the ﬁrst subperiod, while general commodities
can only be produced during the second subperiod. In the ﬁrst subperiod, agents participate
in a decentralized market where each meeting is bilateral and is a random draw from the set
of pairwise meetings. In this market the terms of trade are determined by bargaining. In the
1In a recent paper, Aruoba and Wright [1] also introduce capital in the Lagos-Wright model but they assume
it cannot be used as a medium of exchange.
4second subperiod agents produce general goods and can trade in a centralized market. All
agents are anonymous and there is no commitment or public memory, so all trade must be quid
pro quo.
Let u(q) and −v(q) be the utility of consumption and production of special goods. Assume
that u(0) = v( 0 )=0 , u0(q) > 0, v0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, v00(q) ≥ 0, and that there exists ¯ q>0
such that u(¯ q)=v(¯ q). W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tu0(0) = ∞,a n du0(∞)=0 . Consumption of c
units of the general good yields c utils and production of c units yields −c utils.2 Individual
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where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information available at time 0 and
β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor.
In addition to goods, there is an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible and storable asset
called money.L e tMt denote the stock of money available in (the ﬁrst subperiod of) period t.
The gross growth rate of the money supply is constant and equal to γ;t h a ti s ,Mt+1 = γMt.
Money is injected, or withdrawn if γ<1, through lump-sum transfers or taxes T.W eu s eφt
to denote the price of money in terms of general goods in the second subperiod of period t.
Lagos and Wright [9] assume that both general and special goods are perishable, so money
i st h eo n l ya s s e tt h a tc a nb eu s e da sam e d i u mo fe x c h a n g e .H e r ew ea l s oa s s u m et h a ts p e c i a l
goods are perishable, but allow agents to accumulate general goods. Therefore, during the
ﬁrst subperiod, the feasible trades may involve exchanges of special goods, general goods, and
money. In the second subperiod, trades may involve general goods and money. So in our setup,
both money and general goods may serve as media of exchange. We give agents access to two
diﬀerent storage technologies for general goods. By storing x t units of general goods at time t,
an agent can get k t+1 = F (x t) units of general goods before the decentralized market of the
following period. Alternatively, by storing xit units of general goods at time t, an agent gets
2For tractability, we only need that either the cost of production or the utility of consumption of the general
good be linear. The quasi-linear speciﬁcation eliminates wealth eﬀects and helps keep the model tractable. Here
we assume that both are linear because this simpliﬁes the notation with no signiﬁcant loss of generality. See
Lagos and Wright [9] and footnote 4 for details.
5kit+1 = Fi(xit) units of general goods after the decentralized market of the following period.
While this second technology is not crucial for our results, it makes our framework more easily
comparable with existing monetary models with capital accumulation. The key distinction
between the technologies F  and Fi is that the goods stored using the Fi technology cannot be
brought in the decentralized market to be used as a medium of exchange. For simplicity we will
refer to the general goods stored using technologies F  and Fi as liquid capital (in the sense of
capital goods that can be used as media of exchange) and illiquid capital respectively.3 Both
Fi and F  are strictly concave, satisfy F0
i(0) = F0
 (0) = +∞ and Fi(0) = F ( 0 )=0 . Finally, we
assume limxi→∞ F0
i(xi) <β −1 and limx →∞ F0
 (x ) <β −1.
3 Social optimum
Consider the problem of a social planner wishing to maximize average utility. Let qt be the
quantity traded in each match (since agents are anonymous, they are treated symmetrically by
the planner), and ct the net consumption of general goods. The planner’s problem is:





βt {α[u(qt) − v(qt)] + ct} (1)
s.t. ct + xit + x t ≤ kit + k t (2)
kit+1 = Fi(xit) (3)
k t+1 = F (x t) (4)
with ki0 and k 0 given. Equation (2) is a feasibility constraint for general goods: net consumption
of general goods (ct) plus the quantity of general goods brought into the next period in the
form of liquid and illiquid capital (x t +xit) cannot exceed the available stock of general goods








 (x t)=1 (7)
3Aruoba and Wright [1] is a special case of our setup with F  (x)=0for all x.O u r m o d e l a l s o n e s t s t h e
commodity money model of Burdett, Trejos and Wright [4].
6for t ≥ 0. Equation (5) deﬁnes q∗,t h es o c i a l l ye ﬃcient quantity traded in each match. Equations
(6) and (7) characterize the socially eﬃcient levels of investment in illiquid and liquid capital.
Let x∗
i and x∗




  = F (x∗
 ).4 Having characterized the eﬃcient allocation (q∗,k∗
i,k∗
 ), we turn our attention to
the decentralized economy.
4 Equilibrium
For convenience, hereafter we suppress the time subscript t, and shorten t +1to +1 and t − 1
to −1. Consider an agent who holds m units of money, ki units of illiquid capital and k 
units of liquid capital at the beginning of the ﬁrst subperiod. We use s to denote his real
portfolio (z,k ,k i) ∈ R3
+,w h e r ez = φm is the real value of money holdings. Before entering
the decentralized market, each agent will choose the amount of money and liquid capital he
brings into the decentralized market to be used as means of payment. Let ¯ s =( z,k ,0) denote
the quantities of liquid assets owned by the agent, and let a ≤ ¯ s denote the portfolio he actually
chooses to carry into the decentralized market. We will subsequently refer to a as the agent’s
“liquid portfolio”.5
The terms at which a pair of agents will trade in the decentralized market depend on their
liquid portfolios. When the buyer and seller hold liquid portfolios a and a0, the terms of
trade are [q (a,a0),d(a,a0)],w h e r eq (a,a0) ∈ R+ is the quantity of special good traded and
d(a,a0)=( dz,d  ,d i) ∈ R3
+ represents the transfer of real assets (in terms of general goods)
from the buyer to the seller. Since illiquid capital cannot be brought into the decentralized
market, di =0 . The quantities of real money balances and liquid capital paid to the seller are
dz and d .
Let V (s) be the value function of an agent who owns portfolio s when he enters the decen-
4Notice that (6) and (7) imply that along the optimal path, kit = k
∗
i and k t = k
∗
  for all t.I n o t h e r
words, the capital stocks jump to their steady state values in one period. This is simply due to the fact that
the planner’s problem is linear in ct. For example, if the return function was instead α[u(qt) − v(qt)] + U (ct),
with U
0 > 0 and U









0 (ct), instead of (6) and (7).
5In this model where the terms of trade in decentralized meetings are determined according to the Nash
bargaining solution, agents may prefer not to bring all their liquid wealth into a bilateral match (because this
may adversely aﬀect their terms of trade). This possibility does not arise in pure monetary models, where agents
would never accumulate money that they do not intend to bring into a match. Rocheteau and Waller [10] study
the implications of adopting alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions, including some which imply that agents
would always want to bring all their liquid wealth into the decentralized market.
7tralized market, and W (s) be the value function when he enters the centralized market. The
value functions satisfy the following Bellman equation



































+( 1− 2α)W (s)
¾
,
where H(·) denotes the distribution of liquid portfolios. The ﬁrst term is the expected payoﬀ
from a single coincidence meeting where the agent buys q(a,a0) and goes on to the centralized
market with portfolio s − d(a,a0). The second term is the expected payoﬀ from a single coin-
cidence meeting where the agent sells q (a0,a) and enters the centralized market with portfolio
s+d(a0,a). The last term is the expected payoﬀ from going to the centralized market without
having traded in the decentralized market.
Let x denote the vector of choice variables (xz,x  ,x i) of an agent in the centralized market
where xz is the choice of money balances expressed in terms of general goods. In what follows
we will focus on steady state equilibria where real balances are constant over time, which implies
φ/φ+1 = γ. In this context, z+1 = Fz (xz)=xz/γ and we can deﬁne a time-invariant function
F(x)=[ Fz (xz),F  (x ),F i(xi)] w h i c hm a p st h ei n v e s t m e n t so fr e a lb a l a n c e sa n dc a p i t a lg o o d s
into next period’s portfolio. The agent’s problem in the centralized market is
W(s)=m a x
c,x≥0
[c + βV (s+1)] (8)
s.t. c + px = ps + φT (9)
where s+1 = F(x) and p =( 1 ,1,1) is the vector of prices of the diﬀerent assets in terms of
general goods.6 Equation (9) is the budget constraint: the agent ﬁnances his consumption
of general goods and his end-of-period holdings of capital goods and money using the lump-
sum transfer T and his initial portfolio s whose value in terms of general goods is ps.T h e
government uses the lump-sum transfer to inject money in the economy, so T =( γ − 1)M.
Substituting (9) into (8),
W(s)=ps + φT +m a x
x≥0
[βV (s+1) − px]. (10)
Equation (10) has several implications. First, W(s) could be rewritten as W(ps):w h e ne n t e r i n g
the centralized market agents only care about the total real value of their portfolio. Second,
6Since ﬁat money is intrinsically useless, there always exists an equilibrium where it has no value, i.e. φ =0 .
8the optimal choice of x is independent of the initial portfolio s.T h i r d ,W(s+d)−W (s)=pd.
This last observation allows us to write


































Now consider a meeting in the ﬁrst subperiod between a buyer with portfolio s who chose
to bring a into the decentralized market, and a seller with portfolio s0 who chose to bring a0.
The terms of trade (q,d) are determined by generalized Nash bargaining,
max
q,d≤a









where θ ∈ (0,1] is the bargaining power of the buyer. The feasibility constraint d ≤ a indicates





From the ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem, the value of real assets the buyer needs to





If pa ≥ g(q∗) the buyer gets q = q∗ in exchange for liquid assets with a real value of pd = g(q∗).
Conversely, if pa <g (q∗), then the buyer gets the q that solves g(q)=pa in exchange for all
his liquid assets; i.e. d = a.S o w h e n pa ≥ g(q∗), the buyer receives the socially eﬃcient
quantity q∗ in exchange for a part d ≤ a of his liquid portfolio. Else the buyer hands over all
his liquid assets in exchange for a quantity smaller than q∗. Note that the quantity q traded in
the match only depends on pa, the real value of the buyer’s liquid assets. This means that the
seller’s portfolio and the composition of the liquid part of the buyer’s portfolio are irrelevant
for determining the terms of trade in the decentralized market. To make this explicit hereafter
we use a to denote the real value of an agent’s liquid portfolio upon entering the decentralized
market; that is a = pa. Now the bargaining solution can be written as
q (a)=
½
q∗ if a ≥ g (q∗)
g−1 (a) if a<g(q∗).
(12)
9Using (12), (11) becomes
V (s)=m a x
a≤p¯ s
[αSb (a)+αSs + W (s)], (13)
where Sb (a)=u[q(a)]−g [q(a)] and Ss =
R
{pd(a0,a) − v [q (a0,a)]}dH(a0) are the gains from
trade of a buyer and a seller implied by the bargaining solution. According to (13) the agent
chooses his liquid portfolio in order to maximize his expected surplus in matches where he acts
as a buyer. If the constraint a ≤ p¯ s is slack then a = g(˜ q) where ˜ q satisﬁes u0(˜ q)=g0(˜ q).I n
what follows, we assume that S00
b (a) < 0 for all a<g (q∗) to guarantee that the agent’s problem
is concave.7
Lemma 1 (a) The agent solves
max
x,a+1
{−px + β [αSb (a+1)+pF(x)]} (14)
subject to x ≥ 0 and a+1 ≤ Fz (xz)+F  (x ) where xz ∈ R+ if the equilibrium is monetary and











 (x )=1 (16)
βR(a+1)F0
z (xz) ≤ 1=if xz > 0 (17)
R(a+1) ≥ 1=if a+1 <F z (xz)+F (x ). (18)
The maximization problem in part (a) states that the agent chooses a vector of investments
x and the value of the liquid portfolio a+1 he will take to the decentralized market in order
to maximize the expected discounted values of search, Sb (a+1), and of next period portfolio,
pF(x), net of the cost of acquiring the portfolio, −px.
The ﬁrst-order conditions (15)-(18) are quite intuitive. Condition (15) equates the price of
general goods, 1, to the discounted utility value from saving an additional unit of the general
good as illiquid capital. Since utility for general goods is linear, the discounted value of an
additional unit of illiquid capital to the agent is just its discounted net rate of return βF0
i.
7This assumption is a restriction on u(·), v(·) and θ.I ti ss a t i s ﬁed, for instance, if θ is close to 1.
10Similarly, (16) equates the marginal return to investing an additional unit of general goods as
liquid capital to the price of general goods. The total return on liquid capital can be factored
into two parts. First, there is the technological return F0
 , since agents partly invest in liquid
capital simply to reap the beneﬁts of its storage technology. But liquid capital in contrast to
capital, also yields a liquidity return R ≥ 1.T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that liquid capital can play
an additional role as medium of exchange.
Condition (17) states that if real money balances are to be held, then at the margin their
expected discounted rate of return (βR/γ) must equal the marginal cost of acquiring real
balances which is 1 if money has value. In contrast to illiquid capital, money has value not only
for its intrinsic return (1/γ), but also for its return as a medium of exchange, R. Condition
(18) says that if liquid capital and real balances yield a liquidity return, i.e. if R>1,t h e nt h e
agent will choose to bring all his liquid assets into the decentralized market. Finally, note that
(15) is identical to (6), so the choice of illiquid capital in the equilibrium always coincides with
the social planner’s.
Deﬁnition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a vector of individual choices (x,a +1),t e r m so ft r a d e
(q,d) and a sequence of prices {φt} such that (x,a +1) solves (14), q = q (a+1), g (q)=pd and
φt = xz/Mt+1. An equilibrium is monetary if φt > 0 and nonmonetary otherwise.
5 Fiat money, capital and welfare
We begin by studying the economy when ﬁat money is not valued.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique nonmonetary equilibrium. If k∗
  ≥ g (˜ q),t h e nki = k∗
i,
k  = k∗
 ,a n dq =˜ q.I fk∗
  <g(˜ q),t h e nki = k∗
i , k  >k ∗
  and q<˜ q.
The eﬃcient stock of liquid capital, k∗
 , is large enough to allow agents to trade ˜ q,t h el e v e lo f
output that maximizes the buyer’s surplus in the decentralized market, when the primitives (F ,
β, u, v, θ)a r es u c ht h a tk∗
  ≥ g(˜ q). For instance, this condition will be satisﬁed for economies
with very productive storage technologies or where agents are very patient. In this case k∗
 
provides buyers with enough liquidity to maximize their gains from trade in bilateral trades
and as a result, R =1 : the marginal net liquidity return on liquid capital is zero. Note that the
buyer’s desired quantity traded in the decentralized market, ˜ q,i sl e s st h a nq∗ whenever θ<1.
11So the nonmonetary allocations coincide with the planner’s choices if and only if k∗
  ≥ g (˜ q) and
θ =1 .
When k∗
  <g(˜ q),t h es o c i a l l ye ﬃcient stock of liquid capital is not large enough to allow
agents to trade ˜ q. In this case, agents accumulate liquid capital in excess of k∗
  to trade them
in the decentralized market, and hence the stock of liquid capital is ineﬃciently high. In this
equilibrium liquid capital pay a liquidity premium R>1 and output in the decentralized market
is ineﬃciently low. This overaccumulation result is due to the fact that liquid capital play two
roles: they are held as an intrinsically productive asset as well as a medium of exchange. When
R>1, the overall return on liquid capital exceeds its “technological” return. On the other
hand, since illiquid capital cannot serve as a medium of exchange, F0
i = β−1 >F 0
 . This result
is reminiscent of the dynamic ineﬃciencies that arise in overlapping generations models, where
overaccumulation of the productive asset results when it serves an additional role as a store of
value. Similarly, in Bewley-type models, overaccumulation of the productive asset results when
it serves an additional role as a means to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks.
Next, we focus on equilibria where money is used as a medium of exchange.
Proposition 2 There exists a ¯ γ>βsuch that a unique monetary equilibrium exists iﬀ k∗
  <
g (˜ q) and γ ∈ [β,¯ γ). In addition, ∂k /∂γ > 0, ∂q/∂γ < 0, ∂W/∂γ < 0, ki = k∗
i, limγ↓β k  = k∗
 ,
and limγ↓β q =˜ q. The allocation of the monetary equilibrium converges to the allocation of the
nonmonetary equilibrium as γ ↑ ¯ γ.
From Propositions 1 and 2 we see that a monetary equilibrium exists if and only if the
socially optimal stock of liquid capital k∗
  does not provide enough liquidity, i.e. if k∗
  <g(˜ q).
This means that at k∗
 , in the barter equilibrium agents still want to accumulate additional
liquid capital because of their role as a medium of exchange; recall that q<˜ q, and hence liquid
capital pay a liquidity premium R>1 when k∗
  <g(˜ q). In this case, agents face the following
trade-oﬀ: getting closer to ˜ q requires accumulating liquid capital in excess of k∗
 , reducing
the intrinsic return on liquid capital below its eﬃcient level. But there is also an equilibrium
where money is valued. Real money balances allow agents to cut back on liquid capital and at
t h es a m et i m eg e tc l o s e rt o˜ q. Consequently, the monetary equilibrium Pareto-dominates the
nonmonetary equilibrium.
In a monetary equilibrium (17) holds with equality and the liquidity return is R(a+1)=γ/β.
Substituting this into (16) reveals that liquid capital and money are both held if and only if
12F0
 (x )=1 /γ, namely, if the return on liquid capital, F0
 , equals the return on real balances,
γ−1. In contrast, the gross rate of return of illiquid capital is F0
i(xi)=β−1 which exceeds γ−1,
t h er e t u r no nl i q u i dc a p i t a la n dm o n e y . I ne q u i l i b r i u mi l l i q u i dc a p i t a lc a n n o tb eu s e da sa
medium of exchange and hence it pays an illiquidity premium equal to β−1 − γ−1.J u s ta si n
the barter economy, xi is given by (15) and is always at its eﬃcient level.
From the above discussion we see that money can be held if and only if there is a premium
for liquidity in a nonmonetary economy with liquid capital k∗
 , i.e. if and only if R(k∗
 ) > 1.
But if this is the case, then (16) implies that the stock of liquid capital is necessarily above its
eﬃcient level. This makes clear that ﬁat money helps mitigate the overaccumulation ineﬃciency
due to the shortage of liquid assets. It also reveals why any monetary equilibrium with γ>β
will be ineﬃcient: q will be too low, R>1,a n dk  too high.8 In fact k  = k∗
  if γ = β, but q
will be lower than q∗ unless, θ =1in addition to γ = β.
We conclude by extending our main results to the case of a constant returns to scale storage
technology analyzed by Wallace [12] in an OLG model and by Burdett, Trejos and Wright [4] in a
search model with indivisible money. In our notation: F  (x )=Ax ,w i t hA ≥ 0. The economy
analyzed by Lagos and Wright [9] corresponds to the case with A =0(general goods are
nonstorable). The planner’s problem has no solution if βA > 1, and the solution is indeterminate
if βA =1 .I fβA < 1, the planner sets x∗
  =0 . There is no equilibrium if βA > 1 (agents would
want to accumulate unbounded amounts of liquid capital). Let qn denote the quantity traded in
the decentralized market and xn
  the investment in liquid capital in a nonmonetary equilibrium.
For βA =1we have qn =˜ q and xn
  is indeterminate. More interestingly, if βA < 1 we have








 . In this nonmonetary
economy there is no technological reason to save in liquid capital, yet agents do so to be able
to consume in the decentralized market.
To characterize the monetary equilibrium, notice that with this linear storage technology




, and this interval is nonempty if βA < 1, namely the condition that implies
that the nonmonetary equilibrium is ineﬃcient. Let qm denote the quantity traded in the
8If it were possible to place an exogenous (e.g. legal) restriction that prevented agents from trading the liquid
capital in the decentralized market, such a restriction would be welfare enhancing in this economy. Speciﬁcally,
if the monetary equilibrium with no legal restriction implied k  >k
∗
  and some q, the monetary equilibrium with
the legal restriction would imply k  = k
∗
  and the same q. The agent’s liquid portfolio would be composed of
liquid capital and real money balances in the former, but only of real money balances in the latter. We owe this
observation to Narayana Kocherlakota.
13decentralized market and xm
  the investment in liquid capital in a monetary equilibrium. Agents
accumulate no liquid capital in a monetary equilibrium (γA < 1 implies xm
  = x∗
  =0 )a n d




αβ . Finally, notice that as in
Proposition 2, in this case we have qn <q m ≤ ˜ q and x∗
  ≤ xm
  <x n
 .
6C o n c l u s i o n
We constructed a model where real assets compete with ﬁat money as a medium of exchange and
derived a condition on the fundamentals of the economy under which ﬁat money can be both
valued and socially beneﬁcial. The presence of valued ﬁat money is welfare-improving when the
stock of capital goods that agents would choose to accumulate in absence of a liquidity motive
is too low to provide the liquidity they need for exchange purposes. In this case capital pays
a liquidity premium and, in a nonmonetary equilibrium, agents overaccumulate capital goods.
Under these circumstances the nonmonetary equilibrium is ineﬃcient and it always coexists with
a monetary equilibrium in which both capital and money circulate. Valued money increases
welfare because it allows agents to uncouple the role of capital as a medium of exchange from
its role as an intrinsically productive asset. Under the optimal monetary policy (the Friedman
Rule), ﬁat money provides just enough liquidity so that the incentives to invest in capital are
purely technological and agents choose to accumulate the same capital stock a social planner
would implement.
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14Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .(a) Substitute (13) into (10) to obtain
W(s)=ps + φT +m a x
x≥0,a+1≤p¯ s+1
{β [αSb (a+1)+αSs + W (s+1)] − px},
where s+1 = F(x) and ¯ s+1 =( Fz(xz),F  (x ),0). Using the linearity of W and ignoring the











as stated in the Lemma. (b) Let ∆(x,a +1)=−px + β [αSb (a+1)+pF(x)] and write the
maximization problem in part (a) as maxx≥0,a+1≤p¯ s+1 ∆(x,a +1). From (12) Fz(xz) ≤ g (q∗)
and F (x ) ≤ max[k∗
 ,g(q∗)] so that the set for the control variables is compact. Since ∆(x,a +1)
is continuous, a solution always exists, and it satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions (15)-(18). To
establish uniqueness, consider two cases. First, if k∗
  ≥ g (˜ q),t h e nxz =0 , x  = x∗
 , xi = x∗
i
and a+1 = g(˜ q). Conversely, if k∗
  <g (˜ q),t h e na+1 = Fz (xz)+F  (x ),a n dR(a+1) ≥ 1
which implies a+1 ≤ g(˜ q).S i n c eSb (a) is strictly concave for all a ≤ g(˜ q),i tc a nb ec h e c k e dt h a t
∆(x,F z (xz)+F  (x )) is strictly concave in x for all Fz (xz)+F  (x ) ≤ g(˜ q). As a consequence,
the ﬁrst-order conditions (15)-(18) are necessary and suﬃcient for an optimum.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Existence and uniqueness come from Lemma 1. From (15), xi = x∗
i
so ki = k∗
i.I fg(˜ q) ≤ k∗
 , then the unconstrained solution a+1 = g(˜ q), x  = x∗
  and k  = k∗
  is
available. Conversely, if g(˜ q) >k ∗
  then R(a+1) > 1 (since R(a+1)=1would imply g(˜ q) ≤ k∗
 )
and (16), yields x  >x ∗
  and k  >k ∗
 . The fact that q<˜ q follows from a+1 <g(˜ q).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . From (15)-(18) we see that in a monetary equilibrium (xz > 0)
the allocation (x,a +1,q) is given by F0
i(xi)=1 /β, F0
 (x )=1 /γ, R(a+1)=γ/β, Fz (xz)=
a+1−F (x ) and g(q)=a+1. From this, it follows that ki = k∗
i , ∂k /∂γ > 0 and ∂q/∂γ < 0.F o r
a monetary equilibrium, in addition we need xz > 0,i . e .Γ(γ) ≡ a+1 (γ)−F  [x  (γ)] > 0.S i n c e
Γ0(γ) < 0 and limγ→∞ Γ(γ) < 0, a monetary equilibrium exists iﬀ Γ(β) > 0, i.e., g(q∗)−k∗
  > 0,
and γ<¯ γ deﬁned by Γ(¯ γ)=0 .A sγ → ¯ γ, xz → 0 and the allocation (x,a +1,q) converges to
the equilibrium allocation of the nonmonetary economy. As γ → β, R(a+1) → 1,s ok  → k∗
 
and q → ˜ q.F i n a l l yw eh a v e(1 − β)W = α[u(q) − v(q)], so welfare is decreasing in γ.
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